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Medvedev Could Care Less About Japan’s Reaction to His Visit to Kuril Islands

Submitted by on July 6, 2012 – 5:36 am 10 Comments |  

As discussed in an earlier GeoCurrents news post, tensions remain high between Russia and Japan over the legal status of the four Southern Kuril islands: Etorofu (Iturup), Kunashiri (Kunashir), Shikotan, and the Habomei (Habomai). Japan claims these islands in accordance with the 1855 Treaty of Commerce, Navigation and Delimitation, but the Soviet Union seized them at the end of World War II, and Russia still holds them. In 1956, a joint declaration by Japan and the Soviet Union stipulated that Shikotan and Habomai would be returned to Japan, but because Tokyo kept demanding the return of all four islands, the two sides were unable to sign a peace treaty to formally end World War II hostilities. Earlier this year, the Japanese government offered to negotiate the return of two rather than all four islands, in hopes that the proposed compromise might finally lead to a breakthrough in the decades-old territorial dispute. But now it is Russia that refuses to change the status quo.

During his four-day tour of the Russian Far East, Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev visited the Kuril Islands, where he expressed Moscow’s official position: the Islands became part of the USSR as a result of Japan’s “full and unconditional surrender” at the end of World War II, and therefore Russia’s sovereignty over them is in accordance with the international law and cannot be doubted. Russian officials and historians refer to the San Francisco treaty whereby Japan renounced all claims to the Kuril Islands—which, curiously, the Soviet Union did not sign—and explain away the 1956 agreement as a mere declaration of intent, without the legal power of a treaty.

This is Medvedev’s second visit to the Kuril Islands; his first took place in 2010. During this latest trip, Medvedev visited the construction of a church in Yuzhno-Kurilsk, a settlement of about 6,000 people on Kunashir Island. When asked about the future of the islands by one of the workers, Medvedev responded: “This is our aboriginal land, we won’t give up a yard of it. The one who gives up any of his land provokes a storm”. But it may be the Russian Prime Minister himself who provoked a storm with his remarks, as the Japanese voiced “extreme regret” about the visit. However, Medvedev responded that he “could care less” about the Japanese reaction: “What do we have to discuss with them? The presence of the head of the Russian government on Russian territory? This goes too far,” he said. Russian officials also claimed that the visit is a sign of a renewed concern on the part of the government about the socio-economic situation on the islands, which remains difficult.

A perfect illustration of the socio-economic instability that plagues the islands is the tragic shooting incident that happened just hours before Prime Minister Medvedev’s arrival. An active duty private who served as an armed security guard at the Central Bank opened fire at three accountants working overtime, whom he was supposed to protect. Two of them were shot point-blank and died on the spot, while the third survived but remains in critical condition; the shooter then committed suicide. Police are investigating whether any money was stolen, but some reports blame the bloodbath on the soldier’s nervous breakdown. Some journalists call it Medvedev’s “bad karma” and recall a similar incident that happened during his previous visit to the Far East in 2010, whereby another soldier, whose wedding Medvedev attended just days before, shot himself on duty.

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  • http://twitter.com/stakhanovite Gerard Clare

    The unfortunate nature of this dispute is that the elder generations of Japan have passed on this pointless quest of foolish pride to the younger political generations. There are two chances of Japan getting those islands; slim and none! They would be advised to have taken the two islands when they were offered. They have no chance of getting them by force, so in terms of an agreement, they’ll either have to accept never getting them back, withdraw claims, and drive forward relations, or hope Russia offers one or even both of Shikotan and Habomai to finally end it. Russia is doing nothing wrong in this scenario, you cannot start redrawing the map due to historical longing.

    • http://www.pereltsvaig.com Asya Pereltsvaig

      So we have a historical longing on one side and geopolitical stubborness on the other — a perfect recipe for a continuing conflict. And as I tried to outline in this and the earlier posts, legally the matter is rather dicey. Actually, dividing the four problematic islands two and two might have ended the conflict, but I doubt the sides would ever be satisfied with such a solution anyway.

      • http://twitter.com/stakhanovite Gerard Clare

        The two offered by Russia were the smallest set of islands to be fair, but then the offer was more a symbolic move than some sort of hard bargaining to accurately divide the territory. Legally, maybe dicey for some observers, but I think it’s as legal as any wartime change of territory could ever be. A lot of the fall-out from WW2, and even WW1, is highly questionable. To start discussing it in legal terms means a lot of territory around Europe and the Pacific is going to be disputed. I suspect the Japanese realise they are on a shoogly peg, and it really is nothing more than both a cultural issue in admitting defeat, and how accepting Russian sovereignty would affect their other island disputes with China and South Korea.

        • http://www.pereltsvaig.com Asya Pereltsvaig

          You make some excellent points here, Gerard! Japan and Russia are two countries with so much territorial pride that it’s hard to imagine how either one of them may give anything up in such a dispute. The reason I said that the legal status of these islands is dicey is because the USSR did not sign the agreement that Russia now refers to in order to stake its claim. I would think that an agreement would need to be signed by the relevant parties to be legally binding, no?

          As for the title, I did it this way on purpose, expecting someone to comment on it, so I am glad you did. As a matter of fact, both “couldn’t care less” and the newer “could care less” seem to be idiomatic in English and used to mean the exact same thing, at least for some speakers. Larry Horn, a linguist who has spent a lifetime studying negation in English, has done some work on this… I can look it up for you, if you are interested.

          • http://twitter.com/stakhanovite Gerard Clare

            It’s true about the treaty, but I think it’s a bit of a distraction. The document is never going to be signed now, and it was implemented without the signature. The small details can be important, but on that scale I think it’s a technicality, and an irrelevant one.

            I only really hear the “could care less” expression from the USA, and at a push maybe some UK use it. Let’s just say it’d sound a bit strange hearing it here in Scotland!

            However reading the article would be interesting, thanks. :)

          • http://www.pereltsvaig.com Asya Pereltsvaig

            Good point about legal technicality, but isn’t it what lawyers are all about? The nitty-gritty? I am for one curious about what else is contained in that agreement and why exactly the USSR didn’t sign it. Perhaps there was a deeper reason such as binding it to conditions they didn’t and don’t fulfill?

            As for “could(n’t) care less”, it could well be a US use. All the stuff I’ve seen on this is indeed from the US. I’m afraid I can’t attach a file here and I can’t find an online link at the moment. I will add it later if I can find it… Or send us an email (see contact above) and I will be happy to email you what I have.

          • http://twitter.com/stakhanovite Gerard Clare

            I’m sure I read (not just in this article) that the Soviets didn’t sign it because the Japanese were still going to claim sovereignty over all four islands, even though the treaty would have legally given them Habomai and Shikotan. In essence, the USSR would have legally agreed to give over two of the islands, without making any step forward in diplomacy. Since the peace treaty was a formality, and not essential to avoiding hostilities, they simply didn’t sign it.

          • http://www.pereltsvaig.com Asya Pereltsvaig

            Here is more on the “could care less”:

            http://languagelog.ldc.upenn.edu/nll/?p=2748

  • http://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=697388601 David Schwartz

    The one point of agreement that could help make this work is the Russian need for western technical assistance for resource extraction in harsh conditions.  Since some of this interest over these islands is driven by the interest in hydrocarbons around Kamchatka it may behoove the the Japanese and Russians to work together to extract these resources.  No guarantees this would work, national pride could sink it on general principle.  That and I’m not certain how much experience the Japanese have on platform drilling.